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Magnets, Magic, and Other Anomalies: In Defense of Methodological Naturalism 
 
John Perry and Sarah Lane Ritchie 
 
Abstract. Recent critiques of methodological naturalism (MN) claim that it fails by 
conflicting with Christian belief and being insufficiently humble. We defend MN by 
tracing the real history of the debate, contending that the story as it’s usually told is 
mythic. We show how MN works in practice, including among real scientists. The 
debate is a red herring. It only appears problematic because of confusion among its 
opponents about how scientists respond to experimental anomalies. We conclude by 
introducing our preferred approach, Science-Engaged Theology. 
“The world is full of things that aren’t understood. Almost nothing is understood.” These are 
the words of Professor Martin Uman, a scientist who studies electromagnetics and energy 
systems, as interviewed by the hosts of the Radiolab podcast (Abumrad 2017). In this episode 
he is explaining the mysterious phenomenon known as ball lightning, a disconcerting 
atmospheric event in which a sphere of fire seems to spontaneously form out of thin air. 
While Uman is happy to hypothesize about the cause, he is quick to point out that “the world 
is full of things that aren’t understood.” 
 It would seem from his recent Zygon article that Andrew Torrance thinks real 
scientists don’t talk like that. Doubtless he wishes they would. They would be better scientists 
if they would view the world with as much humility as Professor Uman evidently does when 
studying ball lighting. Perhaps scientists who are Christians sometimes talk that way, but 
even then, the temptation to get in on the scientific game that everyone else is playing—the 
pressure to provide answers “immediately apparent to us”—is often too great. What is to 
blame, Torrance suggests, is methodological naturalism. Hence, to the question posed by his 
title, “Should a Christian Adopt Methodological Naturalism?”, we can already guess his 
answer: an unequivocal No. 
 Outside of a certain Christian academic subculture, methodological naturalism (MN) 
is largely unknown. Or, perhaps more accurately, it rises to the level of controversy only 
within that subculture. Elsewhere, it is considered too obviously right to spend time 
discussing. (This itself may be a point in Torrance’s favor. Obvious answers often turn out 
not to be; instead they are sometimes a way by which people avoid answering awkward 
questions.) So, what is methodological naturalism? The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
has only a passing reference to it in Torrance’s sense, saying, “this kind of ‘methodological 
naturalism’ will not be discussed further here” (Papineau 2016, sec 2.1). The only Wikipedia 
reference to MN quotes the judge’s decision in the Dover, Ohio trial regarding the teaching of 
Intelligent Design in public schools. In short, you could be forgiven for not knowing what all 
the fuss is about. 
 Torrance defines MN as “a method that assumes that the reality of the universe, as it 
can be accessed by empirical enquiry, is to be explained solely with recourse to natural 
phenomena” (691). So, should a Christian adopt methodological naturalism thus defined? In 
contrast to Torrance’s unequivocal No, our answer is a qualified Yes. Or, perhaps putting it 
more carefully, we here argue that the MN debate is a red herring. MN appears necessary to 
its advocates, in part, because of confusion among MN opponents about how scientists 
respond to experimental anomalies. 
 We begin by tracing the history of the MN debate (section 2), showing that it occurs 
on twin tracks, both largely within evangelical theology and philosophy. One track, led by 
Alvin Plantinga, concerns a debate within analytic philosophy and analytic theology, 
regarding epistemology and the philosophy of science. The second track occurs among 
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scientists who are evangelical Christians and regards proper scientific method. Part of the 
confusion around MN is due to these twin tracks proceeding as though they are a single 
discussion. What critics of MN bring to the fore—unintentionally—is a real worry; however, 
it is a misplaced one (section 3). Neither theists nor atheists are required to ‘leave God out’ 
(as Laplace wanted to do) or ‘force God in’ (as in fact Newton did), apart from empirical 
data. Rather, we must think more clearly about how scientists in fact handle anomalies, a task 
which becomes easier when we pay closer attention to our terms. We should avoid using 
indistinct words like ‘science’ and ‘religion’ and, instead, name the various scientific 
subdisciplines (biology, physics) and theological subdisciplines (systematic theology, liturgy, 
theological ethics, biblical theology), which are thought by MN opponents to conflict. Next 
(section 4), we pose a number of examples of how anomalies function in real life. We turn to 
Thomas Aquinas to learn what it looked like from his side of the scientific revolution. What 
we find is surprisingly like our own side of history: it is not possible to empirically 
distinguish irregular anomalies from miraculous anomalies. Here we refer to a previously 
untranslated section of Thomas, together with his little-known work on magic (section 5). As 
a further example, we study the Roman Catholic canonization process, because we think that 
is the sort of dilemma that tempts Torrance to abandon MN. Hopefully, we can find a way 
past without him giving in to temptation (section 6). We conclude (section 7) by reflecting on 
what difference it makes to view anomalies as a healthy and necessary part of the scientific 
enterprise. We will list several hallmarks to our preferred approach, which could be called 
Science-Engaged Theology. 
 
1. What Is this Disagreement Really About? Three Possible Clues 
Given that so much of Torrance’s article rides on how MN is defined, it is odd that he 
does not spend more time on the background to the term. At one point he even concedes, “if 
this is how MN should be defined, I would not have a problem with MN (and there would be 
no point to this article)” (720n3). Clearly, then, we must ensure that we are all agreed about 
what it is! At some points it appears that he only objects to the word naturalism (rather than 
its meaning within MN), because of how the word is used in both MN and a range of 
associated philosophical views, mostly in epistemology. Is our disagreement with him 
anything more than semantic? We think so, but how can we tell for sure? 
One way of identifying the disagreement is proposed by Torrance himself via his 
appeal to “Wittgenstein’s dictum that normally ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language’” (704). So, we would pay attention to the word’s actual use: either linguistically, 
by constructing a genealogy to the term and how it came to be used in our current 
disagreement, or sociologically, by studying current use among scientists. A second way is to 
see if there is any point on which we disagree that does not involve that phrase.1 The second 
way will be made clearer as we proceed: we do disagree with him, mostly in places where he 
thinks faith can change the way a Christian does science—at least in some instances. There 
are some clues that point to when this becomes a site of disagreement: (a) when he uses a 
phrase like ‘scientists qua scientists,’ (b) when saying that MN is inconsistent because it has a 
covert theology of nature, (c) when presuming an incompatibilist view of divine agency, and 
(d) when he uses ‘natural’ in a loaded way: sometimes as a synonym for secular, sometimes 
as a synonym for empirical, and even seemingly as a synonym for naturalistically. We 
explain below why these are locations of disagreement.  
What about the first way: his suggestion that this could be solved by Wittgenstein? 
Fortunately, the sociological work has been done for us. As Elaine Howard Ecklund’s and 
Christopher Scheitle’s exhaustive research has shown in Religion vs. Science: What Religious 
People Really Think, nearly 50% of scientists she studied were religious, and it was rare (or 
even non-existent) for them to experience the cognitive dissonance Torrance thinks is 
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common (2017). The real scientist doesn’t think that she “brackets out her belief in God” to 
adopt MN (693). They are clear about what Torrance fears might be a source of confusion: 
there is no slippage between methodological naturalism and metaphysical naturalism, even if 
we are only referring to the concepts apart from words.2 How the word has been used in 
preceding scholarly debates forms the basis for the next section, where we trace the 
conceptual genealogy of MN. 
 
2. The Mythic History of the MN Debate 
The story, as it’s usually told, gives Paul de Vries credit for starting the MN debate 
with his 1986 article, “Naturalism in the Sciences: A Christian Perspective,” published in 
Christian Scholar’s Review. For example, both Numbers’ earlier history of the concept and 
Poe and Mytyk make this claim, with the latter even going so far as to interview de Vries to 
get the backstory about the coining of the term. The real story is somewhat more 
complicated. 
The source of the article itself might have been an indicator that the MN conversation 
was about to divide into two separate conversations, as CSR is hardly a science journal. 
Indeed, from the start, replies to de Vries’s article progressed along two different tracks, one 
among philosophers responding to the (then new) Reformed epistemology of Plantinga and 
Wolterstorff, and one among evangelical scientists. Later on, as Numbers shows, the debate 
became embroiled in the Intelligent Design controversy, but this is less germane to our topic.  
 De Vries, for his part, doesn’t engage scientists or even philosophers of science. 
Instead, his original piece is functionally a review article of Wolterstorff’s Reason Within the 
Bounds of Religion; more than half the footnotes are to that short work. This book, together 
with Faith and Rationality, helped to launch Reformed epistemology. It is almost as though 
de Vries uses the plight of the Christian scientist as a case study to highlight problems with 
Reformed epistemology, rather than being interested in MN itself. 
“Must a Christian who is a natural scientist live a double life?” de Vries asks. 
Because, according to Wolterstorff, it sure seems like she must. The Christian has certain 
‘control beliefs’ which prevent her from considering certain scientific proposals, for example, 
B.F. Skinner’s behaviorism. De Vries is no more a fan of Skinner’s than is Wolterstorff, but 
he prefers to respond by engaging the specific details of the theory, rather than, as he sees it, 
hiding behind his control beliefs: “Christians can well value behaviorist psychological theory 
while denouncing the misguided attempts to pervert such a psychological theory into an 
entire philosophical anthropology” (De Vries 1986, 392). De Vries cautions against linking 
methodological naturalism with metaphysical naturalism; perhaps Wolterstorff is guilty of 
doing exactly this: “Metaphysical naturalism is a philosophical perspective that denies the 
existence of a transcendent God. Methodological naturalism does not deny the existence of 
God because this scientific methodology does not even raise the question of God’s existence. 
Unfortunately, these two kinds of naturalism have often been confused” (De Vries 1986, 
389). 
We can see why the scientists who replied were sympathetic to de Vries’s proposal. 
De Vries ‘gets’ what scientists see as their mission, much more than does Wolterstorff. As de 
Vries puts it: “In brief, explanations in the natural sciences are given in terms of contingent, 
non-personal factors within the creation. If I put two charged electrodes in water, the 
hydrogen and oxygen will begin to separate. If I were writing a lab report (even at a Christian 
college!), it would be unacceptable to write that God stepped in and made these elements 
separate” (Vries 1986, 389). Many of the scientists or philosophers of science responding to 
de Vries did so by appealing to history, by showing how MN was always the name of the 
scientific game going as far back as Boyle, Newton, and even Aquinas and his mentor, Albert 
the Great. Some of these scientists even included theological reflection that shows MN to be 
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consonant with Augustinian doctrines of sin and divine freedom (Bishop 2013). At the same 
time, we can also guess why Plantinga and Wolterstorff are opposed: their paths on the twin 
tracks go back not to the beginnings of modern science, but rather, the beginnings of modern 
epistemology—namely, classical foundationalism. 
 In case there is any doubt about Plantinga’s real target, consider how he starts his 
critique: “According to an idea widely popular since the Enlightenment, science … is a cool, 
reasoned, wholly dispassionate attempt to figure out the truth about ourselves and the world, 
entirely independent of ideology, or moral convictions, or religious or theological 
commitments.” And that, in turn, forms the basis for MN; adopting MN guarantees that your 
scientific research will produce knowledge of that sort. The key problem, from Plantinga’s 
perspective, is science’s purported neutrality—since “science is anything but religiously 
neutral” (Plantinga 1997). 
 Plantinga is explicit that this is the origin story for his MN genealogy. The ancestors 
of MN were not scientists like Darwin, Bacon, or even Boyle, but instead philosophers 
developing an epistemology fit for the modern age. But one of these villains was Boyle’s 
friend and his Oxford colleague: “One root of this way of thinking about science is a 
consequence of the modern foundationalism stemming from Descartes and perhaps even 
more importantly, Locke” (Plantinga 1997). We don’t have any stake in defending 
foundationalism, be it Cartesian or Lockean, since we agree with Plantinga that it has, in his 
words, “run aground.” In fact, we even agree with Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology, at 
least in its broadest terms, that some sort of replacement is needed for the characteristic 
epistemologies of modernity. What we want to challenge is his genealogy. The key tenets of 
MN far preceded modern epistemology and, what is more, Plantinga’s critique of MN by 
linking it to foundationalism is misguided. His critique is either (a) right but trivial, or (b) 
wrong. 
Perhaps what Plantinga means when he says that foundationalism has run aground is 
simply to point out, “Of course the Enlightenment ideal of wholly perspectival-less 
knowledge is not true.” That would make Plantinga’s objections right but trivial. If you read 
the Essay Concerning Human Understanding and Some Thoughts Concerning Education 
closely enough, you can tell even Locke didn’t think it was true! (Wolterstorff 1996) Instead, 
we think that Plantinga’s real objection simply misses the mark by blaming MN as such for 
what is really at fault: the fact that scientists tend not to be as philosophically careful writers 
as Alvin Plantinga is. His two main examples of Christian belief leading to different 
conclusions than ‘science’ (and consequently his basis for saying that MN cannot be neutral) 
come from Rodney Stark and Herbert Simon.3 However, in both examples Plantinga in fact 
demonstrates a different conclusion than the one he intends. 
In short, some scientists—especially Rodney Stark!—are not particularly skilled at 
properly distinguishing their strictly empirical claims from their non-empirical ones. Mostly, 
in Simon, this takes the form of the author imposing value judgments on what should have 
been simply different approaches to rationality. What really irks Plantinga, apparently, is 
Simon’s implication that Mother Teresa’s rationality is somehow ‘docile’. But suppose 
Simon had labelled her rationality, Type A, with no suggestion of hierarchy or the 
connotation that docility is somehow better or worse than another approach, without the 
negative implications colloquially associated with the word ‘docile.’ It’s true that this would 
not make either Plantinga or us more inclined to agree with Simon’s supposed findings, but 
what it would do is distinguish our objections based on Simon’s dodgy metaphysics from 
questions about the validity of Simon’s experimental method, and consequently render MN 
beside the point. 
Simon is only partially at fault, however: sometimes even Alvin Plantinga writes 
without sufficient philosophical care. Plantinga is guilty of assuming the pejorative 
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connotations of docility, while Simon was using a far more technical meaning. As Simon 
writes, “docility is characterized, then, by a stage of exploration and inquiry followed by a 
stage of adaptation” (Simon 1976, 85). In short, Simon was using docility synonymously 
with teachability. Moreover, he was aware of the potential for misunderstanding about the 
word and worked particularly hard to indicate that the pejorative connotations were not what 
he meant. As Charles McMillan writes, Simon “was never satisfied with the word docility, 
thinking the vulgar usage gave docility an unintended meaning. Yet [Simon’s work] remains 
true to the original meaning of docility, teachability or instructability and how individuals 
learn from social channels for information and advice for decision choices” (McMillan 2016, 
92). Perhaps this serves to emphasize the point that interdisciplinary communication is 
difficult, requires nuance, and is easy to get wrong. 
Yet another example is in Plantinga’s use of Stark. Ironically enough, this insight can 
be found in Torrance’s interpretation of that exchange. As he puts it, Stark’s presuppositions 
could “take a more neutral stance to the question of whether or not God exists—a stance that 
seems much more appropriate to the scientific task. What Plantinga demonstrates in this 
example is a way in which MN can bias science (or sociology) in a way that needlessly 
makes a theory incompatible with theism, when there is no scientific reason for doing so” 
(706, emphasis added). Torrance demonstrates the point nicely: the apparent tensions 
between theology and science are often blamed on MN but are due to less-than-careful 
writing among scientists—and ironically among some philosophers too. 
So much for the various tracks of reply to de Vries’s original article endorsing MN. 
The punchline to all this background, however, is that it was not de Vries who coined the 
term. That turns out to be a long-running myth. Obviously, de Vries didn’t coin the words 
methodological naturalism, but we mean more than that: he didn’t even devise the concept.4 
It was the work of philosopher Edgar Brightman, which far precedes the current debate and, 
more promisingly, suggests a new way out of the cul de sacs in which the twin tracks have 
led us. 
Brightman was a philosopher at Boston University and an ordained Methodist 
minister, but he is better known as the teacher and mentor of Martin Luther King. In 1937 he 
delivered the presidential address to the APA, eastern division, in which he said: 
Such a universal naturalism—common to idealists and realists, to naturalists and 
theists alike—may be called scientific or methodological naturalism. But 
methodological naturalism is sharply to be distinguished from metaphysical 
naturalism. The latter takes the incomplete descriptions and heuristic methods of the 
former to be either final truth about reality or at least the limits of present human 
knowledge. Hardly any naturalist of today would be so rash as to take them as final 
truth. Certainly no man of science would do so; and any philosopher, whether 
naturalist or theist, cuts a sorry figure when he strikes a dogmatic pose. (Brightman 
1937, 158) 
In contrast to Plantinga’s take, here there is scarcely a word about neutrality, or “cool” 
reason, or “wholly dispassionate” truth. Instead MN is guided by the following. First, he 
focuses on the scientist’s tools, and not on the unanswerable and hopelessly vague question, 
“What is proper science?”, abstractly conceived. 
Second, he strives to speak of these tools each within its own subdiscipline of science. 
What would count as evidence in physics is not necessarily the same for biology, much less 
in psychology and theology. Each has its own set of practices, traditions, virtues, and criteria 
for verification. One of the pitfalls in talking about ‘science and religion’ in those terms is 
that it papers over such distinctions among the various scientific subdisciplines (biology, 
physics) and theological subdisciplines (systematic theology, liturgy, theological ethics, 
biblical theology). As Brightman puts is: 
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There is more than one kind of verification. Each science has its own concept of 
verification, which may differ from that used in another science. A mathematician 
verifies his results by one type of procedure, a physicist by another, an historian by 
another. Confusion between the kind of verification possible in physiology and that 
possible in psychology gave rise to extreme behaviorism. … To derive a concept of 
verification from one field and to clamp it down on all fields is, even when baptized 
by the sacred name of scientific method, not method, but methodological dogmatism, 
or methodological chaos. After all, the nature and limits of verification are determined 
by the nature and limits of the field of investigation. (Brightman 1937, 149) 
In addition to these first two points, there is the sense that none of these are new divisions 
between ‘scientific’ knowledge and other ways of knowing. Contra Plantinga, this didn’t 
arrive on the philosophical scene with foundationalism. The contrast between what we can 
know with our senses, that is empiricism, and other ways of knowing, was well-established in 
the medieval university; none of it is the fault of ‘secularism’ or the Enlightenment. These 
lessons from Brightman will guide our discussion. 
 
3. Is MN Humble or a Temptation? 
 One of the strengths of Torrance’s article is that he provides plenty of real life 
examples of the ways that MN, as he sees it, distorts Christian belief. Surprisingly it is rare to 
provide such concrete examples, both among adherents of MN and detractors, and Torrance 
helpfully defies this norm. Plantinga also defies the norm, listing three examples of supposed 
conflict between Christian belief and certain scientific studies in one article, and another 
(Rodney Stark) in his book, Where the Conflict Really Lies. Ironically, it was Torrance 
himself who leads us to conclude that the real lesson from Plantinga’s examples is not that we 
should necessarily abandon MN. Instead, the lesson to be learned is that sometimes scientists 
are not sufficiently philosophically careful—as Torrance demonstrates with Stark and as we 
hinted with Simon. If there are reasons to disagree with Simon or Stark on scientific grounds, 
then by all means let’s hear those. But if those are Plantinga’s reasons for opposing MN, it is 
a red herring. 
Irony aside, could the same be true of Torrance’s article? He advocates an approach 
that he labels “theologically humble,” one within which “a Christian’s practices should 
always reflect her belief that the universe is created and sustained by the triune God.” What 
difference would it make to actual scientific practice if she believed in the triune God? He 
answers: “This leads me to contend that the Christian should adopt a theologically humble 
approach to the sciences (instead of MN), with which she humbly acknowledges that special 
divine action is not discernible by empirical science” (691). He attributes the temptation to 
adopt MN, and by implication the more prideful less humble approach, to the laudable (but 
ultimately misguided) desire to avoid stopping science. ‘Stopping science’ is what happens 
when a person jumps to the conclusion that God did it when faced with a seeming miracle. 
So, if a person appears to have been healed in a way that eludes medical explanation, 
contemporary science will not see ‘God answered our prayers’ as a satisfactory answer. 
Instead, such healing will invite further empirical investigation—investigation that could 
serve to benefit others with similar illnesses. 
While recognizing that many in the field insist that MN is distinct from metaphysical 
naturalism, Torrance suggests that adopting MN actually “presupposes a theology of nature 
(that there is a creator to bracket out), even though this is precisely what is ruled out by a 
naturalistic method.” He continues: “It is important to be clear here that MN does not bracket 
out God; it is the Christian who brackets out her belief in God in order to adopt MN. As such, 
once the Christian has committed to studying the world by way of MN, she operates with the 
assumption that the entire structure and behavior of the natural physical world requires to be 
  7 
 
explained without God, without a theology of nature.”5 In other words, Torrance argues that 
the Christian scientist is forced to exclude from her research aspects of her theological 
knowledge of reality that are, in fact, relevant. In so doing, she is both prematurely 
precluding a full explanation of the phenomenon in question, and also being forced to 
inappropriately adopt a provisional atheism. 
Pay attention to how Torrance uses MN in two different ways: MN implies no 
theology of nature, but instead it becomes a theology of nature. This suggests, among other 
things, that he has an incompatibilist view of divine agency, in which affirming an event as 
divine action implies that there is no natural explanation for that event. Or at least he 
sometimes speaks this way. For example, consider his use of ‘natural’ as a synonym for 
‘secular’, or the way in which ‘naturalistic’ is used in the following passages: “When MN is 
adopted, all scientific explanations are limited to naturalistic explanations” or “So, by 
adopting MN, the Christian decides that a naturalistic understanding is more appropriate to 
the scientific task than her theistic or Christian understanding” (700). If that is his position, it 
is no wonder that he thinks MN is indistinguishable from metaphysical naturalism! In fact, 
reading Torrance generously, we think that is not his view, all things considered. His view is 
somewhat subtler. 
Instead, what is really going on should prompt us to return to the lessons gleaned from 
Brightman’s original article, which was written long before the current (post-de Vries and 
Plantinga) debate. How could Brightman help Torrance to reframe his concerns? Recall that 
the lessons were, one, focus on the tools appropriate to each discipline and not on some 
abstract definition of science and religion. Two, standards of verification differ among 
disciplines, which is another way of saying that epistemology (what counts as knowledge?) is 
discipline-specific. Three, none of this is new, and certainly not modern (i.e., post-Descartes). 
Consider how this would shape Torrance’s critique, beginning with his proposal of a 
‘humble’ approach, in which he says that the scientist should acknowledge “that special 
divine action is not discernible by empirical science” (691). But what does he mean by 
discernible? If his argument is that scientific method cannot identify an event as special 
divine action as such, then of course we would agree: scientific method (and thus MN) can 
never say that an observable event has or has not been caused by God. If, however, he wants 
to say that he knows what the secondary causes or physical processes involved in special 
divine action would look like—or, if he knows for sure that there are not any processes to be 
discerned—then this approach begins to sound anything but humble, for who knows what 
special divine action looks like empirically? 
The same is true for other passages, quoted above. So, when he says, “When MN is 
adopted, all scientific explanations are limited to naturalistic explanations,” Brightman would 
remind us to keep the focus on what scientists actually do: study things empirically.6 If that is 
rewritten, it would read: all scientific explanations are limited to empirical explanations. This 
is unremarkable to the point of being trivial. Something similar could be said about his 
assertion that by adopting MN, the Christian decides that empirical understanding is more 
appropriate to the scientific task than her Christian understanding. 
Perhaps nowhere is this clearer than Torrance’s analogy with vegetarianism (720n6). 
Instead, consider this reworked form of the analogy. Imagine a volleyball referee who makes 
a controversial call; maybe she calls a serve out. When the players are still arguing with her, 
her iPhone beeps. It is a message from her son, who is also at the game: SERVE WAS IN. 
Suppose further that she has no reason to doubt her son’s word: he has good enough eyesight, 
his view was unobstructed, and she knows him to be trustworthy and knowledgeable enough 
about the rules of volleyball. Nevertheless, she should not change her call. Why not? Her role 
as referee requires her to make the call based on what she sees. She may come to doubt her 
initial call but changing it based on her son’s testimony would be to play a different game, as 
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it were.7 Depending on the league’s rules, she could refer to instant replay, but being a 
referee means relying on the tools given to her, appropriate to the practice in question. She 
must call things as she sees them, rather than relying on authority, not because she doubts the 
authority, but only because accepting outside testimony isn’t one of her tools. 
How would this apply to Torrance’s most oft-cited examples? Take Jesus’ miracle of 
turning water into wine. If we were able to observe what was happening at the microscopic 
level when this occurred, we would see water molecules being physically changed into 
alcohol molecules. Otherwise, there would not be any wine to observe. Hypothetically, we 
might see an actual fermentation process taking place at a rapid (seemingly instantaneous) 
pace. A chemist observing this process would certainly acknowledge the physical changes 
themselves but would be limited to describing what she can actually see. Similarly, take the 
seemingly trickier example of Simon Peter’s confession that Jesus is “the Christ, the Son of 
the living God.” Trickier since, as Torrance points out, Peter’s belief was not revealed by 
anything empirical: “what flesh and blood cannot discern” (Matthew 16:17). While this might 
feel like a completely immaterial, subjective experience, who knows what secondary causes 
were used to reveal it to Peter, apart from “flesh and blood, but by My Father in heaven.” 
And, as such, who knows what could be discerned from Peter’s conscious reasons or neural 
activity?8 Just as the chemist might analyze the water-into-wine process, so might a 
neurobiologist use an fMRI to observe the neural changes occurring during one’s experience 
of God. 
Long before the invention of the fMRI, Thomas Aquinas makes this point. Even 
though some miracles are hidden (in his words, “not manifest to the senses”), the effects are 
visible: “the Apostles were endowed with knowledge without studying or being taught … 
although not manifest in itself, yet was made manifest in its effect” (Aquinas ST, 1:105.7). In 
all of these examples, a physical change accompanies God’s action, and this physical change 
is observable. What once was water is now wine; what was once two loaves of bread is now 
enough to feed five thousand; he was dead and now he lives. Even though such events would 
not be recognized by the scientist as divine actions, the secondary causes involved would 
indeed be observable, if and when they happened. 
 
4. Of Red Herrings and Anomalies  
What this section has taught us is that MN’s critics were onto something worthy of 
note all along, but the fault doesn’t lie with MN; that misdescribes the problem. Instead, we 
have argued throughout that while all scientists should be methodological naturalists, or 
something close to it, the problem that Torrance points to is, in fact, a red herring. This is the 
wrong question to be asking. What would the right question be? What should the theistic 
scientist do when faced with something which looks like God “producing the effects of 
secondary causes without them?” (Aquinas ST, 1:105.6). And the right answer is: exactly the 
same as what all scientists should too, be they theistic or not. That is, record it as an anomaly, 
restate your preliminary conclusion in the form of a testable hypothesis, and await more data. 
If something seems anomalous right now nothing should compel the careful scientist to 
render a conclusion in advance of sufficient data. Such a scientist will always keep digging. 
Say, for example, that an unexpected and dramatic physical recovery occurred, which 
a theist was tempted to deem a miracle. (Such a scientist would not be humble if she gave in 
to this temptation.) Torrance assumes that in this situation, an MN-affirming scientist will 
insist that God did not perform this healing, and that there is most definitely a naturalistic 
explanation for the recovery. In his words, “The trouble with MN … is that it does not allow 
the Christian scientist qua scientist to recognize miracles as blind spots. MN requires the 
Christian scientist qua scientist to offer naturalistic explanations of these spots that are likely 
to be inconsistent with her Christian understanding” (701). This is not so. Even employing 
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Torrance’s own definition, MN requires nothing of the sort. MN does not involve an active 
prohibition on God’s activity, but instead maintains a focus on the tools of empirical research. 
The MN-affirming scientist faced with a seemingly unexplainable phenomenon will 
acknowledge that an observable event has indeed occurred and will affirm that this event is 
indeed unexpected and anomalous; she will absolutely see this as a blind spot. 
Torrance himself acknowledges that this should be the case when he affirms that “a 
scientific approach should allow anomalies … to challenge and thereby revise their 
interpretive models and methodology” (701). The difference between his position and our 
own is that he seems to think that this methodological focus on strictly empirical explanations 
somehow involves the more active assertion that the theistic scientist must pretend as though 
God has not acted. This is not the case; using the tools of empirical science, she will simply 
focus on the empirical explanations available to her, and appropriately acknowledge the 
knowledge gaps that remain to be filled. Anomalies, for the scientist, are not threats to 
scientific method, but an invitation to keep digging; to inquire further into possible 
mechanisms and causes for the unexplained event, and to allow such anomalies to provoke 
ongoing research. No, a scientist will not posit divine action as a causal factor in anomalous 
events—but neither will she invent a naturalistic explanation in order to preserve an 
overarching metaphysical naturalist worldview. A good scientist understands that “I don’t 
know” or “I don’t know yet” is always a valid answer.9 
Scientific practice recognizes anomalies as vital to the progression of scientific 
knowledge. Indeed, anomalies have long been acknowledged as vital to scientific progress. 
Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, relies heavily on the role of 
seemingly-unexplainable experimental data in instigating eventual scientific revolutions. As 
he writes, “awareness of anomaly opens a period in which conceptual categories are adjusted 
until the initially anomalous has become the anticipated” (Kuhn 2012, 64). In other words, 
the role of unexplainable phenomena in scientific process is not to direct one’s attention to 
possible supernatural causes, but to test the robustness of current scientific paradigms. If 
anomalous phenomena accumulate to such an extent that a scientific paradigm itself is being 
called into question, then the paradigm itself might be altered or replaced altogether. Indeed, 
the history of science is replete with examples of seemingly supernatural or anomalous 
phenomena subsequently being explained in strictly empirical terms. 
There are different sorts of anomalous or seemingly unexplainable events. As Kuhn 
notes, “if an anomaly is to evoke crisis [and subsequent paradigm change], it must usually be 
more than just an anomaly” (82). It would have to be the sort of thing that could be observed 
with some sort of predictability and regularity. So, it is important to distinguish between 
repeatable, predictable phenomena that currently have no explanation, and true anomalies 
that are unexpected and do not fit current scientific frameworks. For Kuhn, the odd anomaly 
needs to rise to the level of predictable but currently-unexplainable, in order for it to initiate 
paradigm change. In a subsequent section, we distinguish between currently-unexplainable 
regular anomalies and irregular anomalies (which is where a phenomenon like water turning 
into wine would fit; call it seemingly miraculous anomalies). Importantly, however, the 
scientific approach to regular, irregular, and seemingly miraculous anomalous phenomena 
should be the same: one of curiosity and willingness to pursue further research. 
The history of science is full of examples in which seemingly unexplainable 
phenomena are subsequently rendered explicable in empirical terms. Indeed, those who have 
not adopted a posture of curiosity in the face of anomalies and the unexplained have often 
lived to regret it. For example, take the infamous case of Isaac Newton who, when analyzing 
the motions of the planets, surmised that the gravitational interactions between planets (and 
not just between planets and the sun) would eventually cause their orbits to erode. These 
interactions between planets, Newton writes, “will be apt to increase, till this System wants a 
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Reformation” (Newton 1704, query 31). And how will that Reformation be accomplished? 
Invoking Torrance’s words, by special divine action. 
Newton saw this apparent astronomical problem not as a scientific challenge, but as 
an opportunity for God to be directly involved with the physical world. This striking story of 
“God of the gaps” thinking by Newton himself is only enhanced by its epilogue a hundred 
years later. As the (apocryphal?) story goes, the French mathematician Pierre-Simon Laplace 
had an encounter with Napoleon in which the two were discussing Laplace’s work on 
planetary motions. Laplace, for his part, had completed his work without reference to God as 
creator or sustainer—or Reformer. When questioned by Napoleon about this lack of God in 
his exposition, Laplace was reported to have replied, “I had no need of that hypothesis.” We 
see here a striking example of an assertion of direct divine activity, and a subsequent 
articulation of a perfectly adequate scientific explanation. Here, Laplace clearly embodied the 
spirit of MN, and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a rejection of MN, such as 
Torrance has proposed, at the very least opens the door to the sort of ‘miracle’ posited by 
Newton, one which in retrospect proves embarrassing. 
 While Newton offers an example of how not to treat anomalous or unexplainable 
phenomena, we also find examples of present-day scientists willing to acknowledge the 
reality of phenomena currently lacking explanations. In fact, it is so common as to be 
unremarkable for scientists to happily admit “we cannot explain this phenomenon” (Tamura 
2013, sec 2.5). This is simply part of the scientific process, and an integral one at that. What 
is perhaps more interesting than the mundane admission of gaps in mechanistic explanations 
are examples of seemingly ‘spiritual’ interventions that have observable, physical effects. For 
example, acupuncture is a practice within traditional Chinese medicine that has its conceptual 
basis in the concepts of qi (a life force), meridians, and yin and yang. None of these spiritual 
concepts has a basis in scientific knowledge, and acupuncture as a form of alternative 
medicine has been often critiqued. This being the case, it is perhaps surprising that 
acupuncture is available through the UK’s health care system, the NHS, often for chronic 
pain or migraines. Why would an evidence-based health care system like the NHS provide a 
treatment that has been critiqued as pseudoscientific? The answer to this is that even though 
the precise mechanisms operative in acupuncture are debated and not fully understood, the 
practice is observed to have demonstrable effects in some cases. Hypothesized mechanisms 
include the release of endorphins, increased blood flow, and anti-inflammatory effects 
resulting from stimulation of the vagus nerve. What is perhaps most interesting is that doctors 
will often suggest acupuncture for specific conditions, while still acknowledging that they do 
not yet understand the precise mechanism behind this efficacy. As one concrete example, 
consider in vitro fertilization (IVF), a physically stressful treatment for infertility that 
involves intense hormonal stimulation. It has been observed that the use of acupuncture prior 
to IVF is correlated with increased pregnancy outcomes. In other words, acupuncture seems 
to increase the chances that IVF will be successful in leading to pregnancy. It is considered 
good scientific practice to acknowledge and recognize seemingly mysterious phenomena, 
without insisting on an explanation when there isn’t one. 
 
5. More Anomalies: Aquinas on Miracles, Magic, and Magnets 
At the end of the last section, we quoted from the Summa Theologica, where Thomas 
himself answered a question remarkably like Torrance’s. “Whether God can do anything 
outside the established order of nature?” The question was familiar to both Thomas and his 
mentor Albert the Great, and they had developed sophisticated, and prescient, answers to a 
seemingly twenty-first century question. Albert’s opinion is well-known. Even though “he 
acknowledged (with every other medieval thinker) that God is ultimately the cause of 
everything,” he realized that the natural philosopher’s toolset is different than the 
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theologian’s.10 Both thinkers made a conceptual distinction between what we know with our 
senses and sacred doctrine, referring to what is divinely revealed including things held by 
authority. In Albert the distinction was more than conceptual, it was curricular: for example, 
he avoids theology in his works on physics (Grant 2007, 251-52). 
What is within their toolset will at this point be familiar to us: seeing motion, which 
they got from Aristotle, but they would have included our other human senses. Thomas 
makes that clear in a section from his Commentary on the Sentences: “I respond that we 
should say the empyrean heaven cannot be investigated by reason. For whatever we cognize 
about the heavens, this is either via observation or via change; but the empyrean heaven is 
subject neither to change nor to observation …  and so not to natural reason either, but it is 
held on authority.”11 Thomas’s way of putting it is truly stark: if it cannot be seen, it cannot 
be reasoned about. His ‘curricular’ distinctions sound, superficially at least, as though they 
could be setting the stage for something like MN. Is this appearance accurate? What emerges 
is a view of miracles in which they turn out to be a subset of anomalies, but one within 
which, crucially for our purposes, it is impossible to empirically distinguish what belongs to 
which subset.12 
Thomas distinguishes miracles in the strict sense from miracles in a wide sense. Strict 
sense miracles are “something done outside the order of the entire created nature, under 
which order every power of a creature is contained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a 
wide sense, for whatever exceeds the human power and experience.” Examples of the latter 
include the stone being thrown up in the air (miraculous to the stone), penicillin (to everyone 
before Fleming), Hogwarts (to muggles), and Pharaoh’s sorcerers (to Pharaoh). Although 
they are not miracles in the strict sense, “they are sometimes nevertheless something real,” 
for example, the frogs that Pharaoh’s sorcerers conjured were real frogs (Aquinas ST, 
1:114.4). 
Elsewhere, Thomas lists as a criterion that humans cannot work out how miracles 
happen because “no man in this life can mentally grasp the essence of God.”13 Immediately 
several difficulties present themselves. Sometimes, we are told how miracles happen. For 
example, “the strong east wind” allows Israel to cross the Rea Sea on dry ground, but that is 
still a strict sense miracle. Maybe he means that humans can, in principle, work out how they 
are done in terms of cause and effect, but the cause behind that (“essence of God”) is too 
much for humans to comprehend, at least “in this life.” Additionally, human knowledge is 
variable. What causes wonders in one setting will not in another: “as when a man sees an 
eclipse without knowing its cause.”14 
It would seem Thomas has in mind a theoretical upper limit of knowledge he expects 
humans to be able to reach in this life. Consider his example, “Wherefore a thing is 
wonderful to one man, and not at all to others: as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an 
astronomer” (Aquinas ST, 1:105.7). Because some humans possess the ability to explain 
eclipses (i.e., astronomers), he would not consider eclipses miraculous, not even for rustics 
and not even in the weak sense. What he would have said to a case where an apparent miracle 
has been subsequently explained—say, we used to find black holes miraculous, but along 
comes Caltech with an explanation—he never tells us. 
However, none of these distinctions are at all useful in telling miraculous anomalies 
from irregular anomalies. It’s not within the empirical toolset to name something as having 
been caused by God, since, by definition, its cause is “absolutely hidden from all” (Aquinas 
ST, 1:105.7). The most an empirical observation can do is eliminate an anomaly from 
consideration, but what it can never do is identify a miracle. This was Newton’s ‘mistake,’ 
and countless other Christians’ mistakes both before and since: mislabeling something a 
miracle when the scientist’s tools are only competent to call something an anomaly. What 
Newton thought was a miracle, Laplace had no need for. When a rustic beholds the miracle of 
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an eclipse, an astronomer says, “Not so fast! Its cause is not hidden from me.” What used to 
seem like the miracle of penicillin, has a cause clear to biologists and chemists. 
Which brings us to St Thomas Aquinas’s views on magic, in his little known but 
wonderfully titled, “A Letter to a Certain Knight beyond the Mountains on the Occult 
Workings of Nature.” The relevance of the odd treatise to our topic is clear from the opening 
line: “Since in some natural bodies certain natural activities appear whose principles cannot 
be understood…” His letter is about anomalies. Thomas’s way of distinguishing what is 
outside of nature may seem to unusual to us, but it is nonetheless instructive. 
 According to Thomas, what is natural is whatever is in keeping with the elementary 
bodies of the same species; we could say in keeping with the raw physical elements. For 
example, a stone falls downwards because stones are made primarily of earth. However 
sometimes an outside force, a force from outside of the nature of the earthly elements 
themselves, acts on it: “Actions of this sort, therefore, must be traced to higher principles.”  
Tides are the obvious example: water should fall downwards and normally it does, unless 
acted upon by the moon. The moon being a heavenly body, it lies outside of the natural 
powers of the elements. Magnets are Thomas’s favorite example. Medicines can work that 
way, too, he says, because they can affect particular parts of the human body, as opposed to 
affecting all of the body equally. These benign occult phenomena were commonly called 
natural magic, as opposed to demonic magic, but Thomas himself never used that term. 
 Given this framework, something gives Thomas pause. It was also seemingly this that 
prompted “a certain knight beyond the mountains” to write: sometimes the effects of these 
heavenly bodies are inconsistent or even random. As such, what should be categorized as an 
odd but nonetheless explainable event: what is an anomaly and what is a miracle?  
And we think the same thing sometimes happens through the action of God or the 
good angels. For the fact, that sick people were cured at the shadow of Peter the 
Apostle or that some illness is dispelled upon contact with a saint’s relics, is not 
attributable to a form implanted in these bodies, but only to the divine power which 
uses the bodies for these results. 
It is clear that not all the workings of elementary bodies manifesting occult 
operations are like these. Firstly, the said workings, since they do not arise from some 
implanted form, are not found commonly in every individual of the same species: for 
not every bone nor all the relics of the saint heal upon touch, but those of some at 
sometimes. And so neither does every image have effects of this sort, nor does all 
water flow and ebb according to the movement of the moon. But certain secret 
workings are found in some bodies which are likewise found in all which are of the 
same species—for example, every magnet attracts iron. (Aquinas 1939) 
Based on this, we can distinguish three different types of anomalies using Thomas’s 
framework: 
0. Not anomalous after all, if we keep digging more than rustic does (e.g. eclipses). 
1. Irregular anomalies (e.g. lack of tides in your bathtub). 
2. Regular, predictable anomalies (e.g. magnets). 
3. Miraculous anomalies (e.g. relics).  
A couple points of clarification. Regarding (2), he expects these to be caused by heavenly 
powers. Heavenly in this context means ‘higher’ than mundane elements like iron or water; 
namely, anything solar, lunar, and stellar. Regarding (3), this happens when a personal—that 
is, not solar or stellar—higher power causes an event “outside the usual natural course of 
things.” Only if it’s caused by God apart from any other created being would Thomas 
consider it a strict-sense miracle. 
Apart from it being fascinating to realize that Thomas had views on natural magic, 
and he bothered to write to a knight about it, how can this help us with our study of MN? The 
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difference between irregular anomalies, currently-unexplainable regular anomalies, and 
apparently miraculous anomalies is not fixed, nor could it be, by empirical means. What 
about Thomas’s examples; how should they be categorized?  
 Magnets would fit with the second. (He was under the impression that magnets had 
their power from something beyond earth. We know now that the magnetic poles reside 
beneath the earth’s surface, but let that pass.) Likewise, he regards some medicines as 
anomalous, “as rhubarb always purges a definite humor.” Relics is his example of the third: 
God or angels use relics to convey their power. But what about tides, dramatic healings, 
Peter’s shadow, and eclipses? Into what category should they fall? 
 What separates magnets, relics, and the tides between the categories, is, and must 
remain, fluid and contingent. To think otherwise was Newton’s ‘mistake,’ and those places 
when Thomas himself verges on giving in to the same temptation potentially lead to 
embarrassment. And he should have known better: after all, that was the point of his eclipse 
anecdote. Whenever you are tempted to definitively label something a miracle, know that 
odds are you will end up looking like a rustic, not a scientist. This is how science should 
work, and in keeping with Kuhnian science, does work. 
We begin by noticing unexplainable events that appear to be irregular or random, like 
the water in your bathtub. Oceans are affected by the moon, why is it not the same for the 
water in your house? It turns out that your tub has so much less mass than the moon that it’s 
impossible to see the tides there, but they are there nonetheless (if we had a fine-tuned 
measuring system and the water was spread out over a sufficient distance that the gravity of 
the moon could make a difference). So, when we look more closely, it turns out to be not an 
irregular anomaly (1), but only a regular anomaly (2), like how Thomas thought magnets 
worked. But we should not stop there. It further turns out that the moon, like the magnetic 
pole, is part of the same empirical system that water and iron are. So, when we look still more 
closely, what appeared to be a regular anomaly (2) turns out (0) not to be an anomaly after 
all! Sure enough, the eclipse anecdote proves right, even when Thomas himself is the target: 
his analysis of tides and magnets is more rustic than scientific. 
What is required to identify a miraculous anomaly is not seeing with your senses. This 
takes the theologian’s tools. As far as the scientist can see, relics, Peter’s shadow, and 
dramatic healings are all unexplainable, irregular anomalies. One way that such events could 
move between Thomas’s three categories is, if given more data, we find ourselves 
increasingly curious: is that irregular? Maybe it's like the tides in your bathtub. If the story of 
Peter’s healing shadow was meant to be taken historically, maybe we would find that it was a 
regular anomaly, and as such, subject to further empirical study. Who knows? It may be ripe 
for Kuhnian paradigm change. But what we must not do is say we are using empirical tools 
when we are not. “To derive a concept of verification from one field and to clamp it down on 
all fields is, even when baptized by the sacred name of scientific method”—or even, one 
might add, theological method—“methodological chaos. After all, the nature and limits of 
verification are determined by the nature and limits of the field of investigation” (Brightman 
1937, 149). 
There is a punchline to Newton’s story. Even though his line about the System 
wanting a Reformation would suggest that he advocated a God of the gaps, he was also aware 
of the danger of positing this. An instance can be found in the same work that he uses this 
line. Newton’s interest in alchemy was well-known but he didn’t think that natural 
philosophers should hide behind ‘occult qualities’ as though it was the same thing as science. 
In Newton’s telling, what was happening was that old-school Aristotelians were using the 
category of occult qualities as a stand-in for “I don’t have any idea how this happens.” Their 
default explanation became, The occult did it. Newton, despite his interest in natural magic, 
had no time for these would-be explanations: “Such occult qualities put a stop to the 
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improvement of natural philosophy, and therefore of late years have been rejected. To tell us 
that every species of things is endow’d with an occult specifick quality by which it acts and 
produces manifest effects is to tell us nothing” (Newton 1704, 3.1). The parallel to Torrance’s 
and Plantinga’s phrase, stopping science, is difficult to miss. 
This pushes us to see a further reason to defend MN. It’s not because MN somehow 
constrains science or reason, rather it is MN’s critics who stop science from doing more. 
Those critics stop anomalies from functioning as they can, at their best. Anomalies should 
press us to observe unexplained events with curiosity, and to look more closely at the data 
they didn’t notice before. What distinguishes magnets from tides, rhubarb from eclipses? 
Anomalies press us to keep digging. 
 
6. When Archbishop Bartolucci Needs a Pathologist 
 We have a guess about what really worries MN’s critics. In fact, lots of scientists, 
philosophers, theologians, both laypeople and clergy, are troubled by the same, and 
sometimes we are as well. How should we handle those situations where we seem to need 
multiple toolsets? How should they interact? For example, what about when the bishop needs 
a pathologist, if he is going to do his job? How should scientists regard that, and how should 
the church interpret the scientist’s conclusion? Fortunately, there is a long-standing 
traditional, theological answer to that question, and it does not involve abandoning 
methodological naturalism. It is called Rules of the Medical Consultation of the Congregation 
for the Causes of Saints, and the latest version was written by someone called Archbishop 
Marcello Bartolucci. 
 To be declared a saint the church requires reliable evidence of multiple miracles. To 
judge the evidence they need scientists, normally medical doctors specializing in some 
specific disease. As the entire process of canonization takes place within the church, and 
presumably all the participants could be Christians (if the Vatican chooses), maybe this is not 
unlike what Torrance has in mind when he writes, “there may come a day when there is 
universal recognition that God exists.” How would he think the practice of science would be 
different “on that day”? 
On that day, the question on the lips of every scientist would not be, “What is to be 
gained by dropping the commitment to MN?” … Rather, the question that would be 
asked would be, “What is there to be gained by adopting MN?” It is this latter 
question that the Christian scientist should be asking himself today… I do not think 
that scientists would continue to endorse MN, unless it was redefined as a 
methodology that allowed for the possibility of supernatural explanations. (709; 
722n23, emphasis added) 
The word Torrance may have had in mind in the last sentence is anomalous. That is: Unless 
MN was redefined as a methodology that allowed for the possibility of anomalous 
explanations. Since MN, in keeping with the scientific method generally, already admits the 
possibility of anomalies, we are already living on that day. “On that day, the question on the 
lips of every scientist” is still: “What is there to be gained by adopting MN?” And the right 
answer is still: what is gained is the distinctive toolset of chemists, physicists, biology, 
neuroscientists, since it is only with their tools that we are able detect anomalies at all. 
Remember Thomas: how else can we separate what is due to magnets, tides, rhubarb, and 
whatever else? Only with that is our curiosity stirred, and we are driven to form hypotheses 
and test them using tools of our senses. The canonization process bears this out, to which we 
now turn. 
 The process for the Medical Consultation of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints 
is methodologically naturalistic (Bartolucci 2016). An independent Board of Medical 
Experts, whose competence is in the field of the alleged healing, will investigate. To be 
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successful, five of the seven experts “have to testify that a complete cure has really taken 
place and that it cannot be explained.” Further: “Any cure that could be attributed to 
autosuggestion, anything of the nature of hysteria, etc., will be rigorously excluded. Cures of 
epilepsy, etc., have been rejected, for it can hardly be proved that the disease will not recur. It 
is useless to put forward cures where there has been an operation, for it will be held that the 
operation, rather than the intercession of the servant of God, was responsible for the cure” 
(Hallett 1952). Additional rules are in place to insure the Board’s autonomy, including 
financial independence. Because any given verdict of whether a cure was anomalous would 
be based on our then-current understanding of medicine, the verdict may well change with 
new medical discoveries. For example, what Thomas attributed to the power of the stars is in 
fact explicable if you know the chemical properties of rhubarb. 
Archbishop Bartolucci thinks it is worth maintaining multiple practices in the mix, 
each with its own principles of verification: pathology’s tools, ecclesial tools, philosophical 
tools, and so on. “The 1917 Code of Canon Law established access of the miracle to 
theologians only after the alleged miracle had been studied and verified by two expert 
doctors, aside from issues of philosophical and religious consideration. And even today it is 
so: the scientific aspect remains distinct from the theological” (quoted in Brockhaus 2016). 
What is the point of keeping the Vatican’s distinction? Or, as Torrance asks, “What is there to 
be gained by adopting MN?” 
Only this: it is the job of the Medical Board as physicians and pathologists to know 
what can be explained by forming and testing hypotheses using empirical methods, since 
medical testing is empirical itself. It is not within the Medical Board’s tools to declare 
whether a miracle has taken place. That is the church’s job, since it is within the 
ecclesiological toolset. What is within the Medical Board’s competence to say? Whether an 
anomaly has taken place. As Professor Uman—he of the ball lighting—might say, “The 
world is full of things that aren’t understood,” or the authors of a recent study of the 
microbiomes of mice did say, “We cannot explain this phenomenon.” 
 
7. Swiss Army Knowledge 
As we have argued throughout, the objections to MN are based on a confusion about 
how the scientific method treats anomalies. If that confusion is cleared up, the objections fall 
away, proving to have been a red herring all along. There is no good reason to abandon the 
scientific method’s focus on the empirical toolset, and many good reasons to preserve this 
focus. When Torrance says, “MN requires the Christian scientist qua scientist to offer 
naturalistic explanations” that would only be true if MN forbade anomalous data, if MN 
insisted on giving up the scientist’s rightful vocation to keep digging. 
Torrance looks forward to the day when God’s existence is treated as obvious, 
presumably the way that gravity is. If it’s not universal, you can safely ignore those who deny 
it. “On that day it would be hard to imagine that the scientific world would continue to 
believe that scientists qua scientists should discount the possibility of there being theological 
explanations for natural phenomena.” If his Christian scientists really are functioning as 
scientists qua scientists, of course they should discount “theological explanations for natural 
phenomena,” since qua scientists, they are speaking empirically. Why? Theological 
explanations are not within the scientific toolset; they are within the theologian’s toolset. 
Theologians, too, have their principles of verification, and among these are tradition, 
Scripture, reason, and experience. Maybe what Torrance is meaning to ask is, what about 
when scientists function qua theologians or theologians function qua scientists? 
That would be a worthwhile challenge to our view. Maybe in defending MN, we have 
nonetheless given away something valuable. We may have distinguished science from 
theology so thoroughly that we are headed in the direction of Gould’s non-overlapping 
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magisteria. That would be a mistake. Instead, it is precisely because of our commitment to 
various sciences (e.g., science of the human mind, psychopharmacology) and various 
theological disciplines (e.g., moral theology, theological anthropology) that we care that 
whatever science we draw on is done well. We write from a perspective that could be called 
Science-Engaged Theology. In what remains of our article, we will list a handful of 
distinguishing features of our vision for a new generation of science and theology. 
To understand our proposal, we must return to something we noted above but so far 
have left unexplained. As far as we can tell, it was Brightman who first distinguished 
methodological from metaphysical naturalism. And as we learned, much of his argument for 
MN involves establishing that there are multiple principles of verification: the 
mathematician’s, the historian’s, the anthropologist’s, and so on. What could be the relevance 
of this point to what was Brightman’s larger goal, that of proposing MN? 
It wasn’t until just one hundred years before Brightman’s lecture that the word 
scientist was coined. It was quite self-consciously an invented term. To many in the early 
nineteenth century, the decline of the term natural philosophy came with a price. No longer 
was there single faculty to unify the various empirical disciplines. Instead, it was like “a great 
empire falling to pieces,” so increasingly divided were they into “infinitely small allotments” 
(Harrison 2015, 160-161). So said William Whewell, who proposed a number of options by 
which he aimed to help restore that fallen empire. What was missing, he thought, was a 
“name by which we can designate the students of the knowledge of the material world 
collectively.” He considered nature poker, nature peeper, savens, and scientist. Even though 
some complained that ‘scientist’ sounded like a job an American would do, that term 
eventually won out. 
One hundred years after that, as Brightman was writing his presidential address, he 
was seeing the consequences of this unification. Instead of “infinitely small allotments” (e.g., 
biologists who work exclusively in sub-sub-subdisciplines), he faced a too great empire. 
What should have been relevant differences among the sciences were elided or smoothed out. 
He was trying to counteract the belief that, seeing as they were all scientists, they were 
subject to the same methods of verification, be they biologists, historians, anthropologists, 
and so on. Hence, we can better understand what he meant when he wrote, “To derive a 
concept of verification from one field and to clamp it down on all fields is, even when 
baptized by the sacred name of scientific method, not method, but methodological 
dogmatism.” He needed to overturn that dogma if MN would be seen as plausible. 
Brightman’s insight is still needed today, maybe more than it was in the 1930s. 
Surveying the past generation’s work that has been conducted under the heading ‘science and 
religion,’ we can quickly see that both are overly broad categories. You cannot answer the 
question, What does science think about that?, thus constructed, any more than you can say 
what ‘religion’ thinks—even though they are sometimes united by a single term (scientists? 
religionists?). Much of the very best work of the preceding generation has already taken that 
insight to heart. We should not ask, “What do science and religion say about, for example, 
evolution?” because it’s a hopeless question, thus formed. But, “What can neuroscience of 
addictions and the Eastern Orthodox liturgy teach us about moral habit formation?”—that 
would be an excellent, and answerable, topic. 
One sign that the overbroadness of the categories is partly to blame is how much 
attention has been paid to methodology since Barbour’s Religion in an Age of Science, and 
even before that book. Who knows how many rival typologies have been proposed for 
relating science and religion? None of them are fully satisfying. How could they be anything 
but unsatisfying within those categories, thus formed? It was as though every time a typology 
proved inadequate, what was to blame was the typology: so, we really must do some more 
study of the rival methodologies. Repeat, ad nauseam. And it’s still going on.15 But what 
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would happen if we set aside methodology, just for a minute, and start with some particular 
claim that is at home in one or another specific subdiscipline, and then work out, as needed, 
points of methodology on an ad hoc basis. This would be Science-Engaged Theology. 
In contrast to the increasing specialization of the last two centuries of science—in 
fact, this ‘siloing’ has been taking place in all sorts of areas of knowledge—we propose an 
analogy with the Swiss Army Knife. Call it Swiss Army Knowledge or, even better, Swiss 
Army Science—understanding science (scientia) in the older sense of natural philosophy. 
The point of our analogy is, like the famous knives, seeking knowledge involves a 
collection of different, well-defined tools. You open wine with the corkscrew, cans with the 
can opener, and you cut paper with the scissors. Sure, you can do all that with a kitchen knife, 
but cannot do it well. It would not be good ‘science’. We can see with this analogy how the 
preceding two or so centuries of increasing specialization have their role to play. It enabled 
the development of well-defined tools, some requiring specialist training. A little bit of 
siloing has its place, because different tools require different sets of expertise to wield 
effectively: often years of practice and enculturation within a tradition. At the same time, 
there is no point in pretending that you only need one tool, which is what Brightman was 
trying to remind his contemporaries of: not everything that scientists practice is subject to the 
same method. Even though they all use what could be called a knife, it is a special sort of 
knife, one containing multiple tools: a Swiss Army Knife. 
Swiss Army Knowledge is not an attempt to revive natural philosophy, but we are 
encouraged to have historical precedent. Within natural philosophy there was, thankfully, no 
sign of the endless quarantining of faculties, such as we have grown accustomed to in the 
modern university, apart from what is required by the tools themselves. So, you cannot learn 
about the empyrean realm from physics because it is not subject to sight or motion (i.e., don’t 
use the screwdriver to open wine). But, there are all sorts of questions that cannot be 
adequately answered except by using multiple tools. Swiss Army Knowledge enables us to 
see that the tools are different, but inseparable, at least for complex tasks. And for those tasks, 
you need to know how to use the tools. 
What Swiss Army Knowledge doesn’t strive to emulate from natural philosophy is the 
endless fights to be the queen. Is philosophy the queen of the sciences? So believed Plato. Is 
it theology? So said Augustine and Aquinas. You need only read the title of Newton’s book 
to know his answer: Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica. And, was it a 
coincidence that Brightman wrote of the chaos that comes with baptizing ‘by the sacred name 
of scientific method’, only decades after G.E. Moore set the tone for the twentieth century’s 
take on natural philosophy, with his answer, Principia Ethica (which dodged the ‘natural’ 
part), and Whitehead and Russell proposed their answer in the Principia Mathematica 
(dispensing with the ‘philosophy’ bit)? What a waste of time.16 The ruler can be ad hoc; call 
it queen for a day. 
Not all of theology need be science-engaged. Many research questions will be fully 
addressed within a specialized scientific or theological framework. But it is impossible to 
answer certain questions without drawing on some specific area of theology and some 
specific science. It is not as though these only involve new questions or arises only within 
innovative theological methods; they have been there from the beginning. Both Augustine’s 
and Thomas’s theologies of marriage depend, in part, on biology and anthropology-sociology 
(as does St Paul’s, in places). One of Thomas’s reasons for opposing polygamy is that, in 
societies where it is practiced, the plural wives are treated as menials—and according to 
Thomas marriage should be a “friendship of equality” (Aquinas SCG, 3.124). So, who is to 
say if that is true unless you train, at least a little, in sociology? And, while we are at it, who 
is to say that children fair better when raised by parents who have equal friendships? Or, 
consider the fact that premillennialism (the conservative evangelical eschatology) seems 
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straightforwardly at odds with the standard Enlightenment ‘eschatology’ of, for example, 
Steven Pinker. All things considered and in the long run, are things getting better or worse? 
Gould’s non-overlapping magisteria could weasel out of this tension, but it’s doubtful if the 
evangelicals—much less Pinker—want to follow Gould here; nor do we. There is only one 
reality, but many tools. 
We are currently involved with a series of research projects that are trying to put this 
vision into practice. For example, when the Roman Catholic church funds agricultural 
development work in Honduras, they need to know about both agroecology and theologies of 
natural law to tailor their agricultural practices to local ecologies. Or: within medicine, should 
a Christian view of bodily integrity change the way one understands the relationship between 
pain management and opioid addiction? Or: how might theologies of habit and belief 
formation interact with neurobiological research on religious experience? Or: is the latest 
trend within moral neuroscience—in short, Hume was right all along—a threat to moral 
theology, or proof that the Christians also had it right? These are not the sorts of questions 
that can be addressed in the abstract with vague references to science, religion, or naturalism, 
but topics at the intersection of the specific sub-disciplines of agroecology and natural law, 
addiction research and theological ethics, neurobiology and Aristotelian-Thomistic theologies 
of habit. 
 
We have mixed feeling about introducing Science-Engaged Theology this way. After 
all, our premise is that we should focus less on methodology, and ironically, we have just 
devoted an article to it. Still we have reason to hope that our opponents could find reason to 
embrace this view. As one of these critics once put it, “the world as God created it is full of 
contingencies. Therefore we don’t merely think about it in our armchairs, trying to infer from 
first principles how many teeth there are in a horse’s mouth; instead we take a look. The same 
should go for the question how God acts in the world: here we should rely less upon a priori 
theology and more upon empirical inquiry” (Plantinga 1997). 
Perhaps we need another moratorium in the style of G.E.M. Anscombe. In the late 
1950s she said that we need to take a break from certain moral concepts until we regain a 
sense of their significance. In the meantime, we should go on calling what is courageous 
brave, what is lustful unchaste, honest truthful, and hopefully, the answer will eventually 
present itself. (And her proposal may have been prophetic: twenty years later, MacIntyre 
wrote After Virtue.) Maybe what has before now gone under the label science-and-religion 
needs to temporally set aside questions of methodology and see where we get. It doesn’t take 
much to recognize that most of the best contributions in this field have already accepted this 
implicitly. We have here presented one way of doing this, but Science-Engaged Theology is 
not the only way; perhaps some updated version of natural philosophy, or something else 
entirely. The hallmarks of our proposal are a focus on the individual subdisciplines (of 
whatever field), valuing training in multiple toolsets, positing no in principle queen of the 
sciences, and a curiosity to always keep digging in the face of anomalies. 
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1 Defining naturalism is controversial even among specialists in the topic. While 
Torrance is using naturalism to refer to a metaphysical worldview that always and 
everywhere excludes the possibility of God (or at least God’s activity in the created world), 
the conversation around naturalism is not so simple. For a helpful overview of the issues, see 
Owen Flanagan’s ‘Varieties of Naturalism.’ For explicitly theistic versions of naturalism, see 
Fiona Ellis, God, Value, and Nature, or Christopher Knight’s ‘Theistic Naturalism and 
‘Special’ Divine Providence.’ Here, we here engage with Torrance on understanding of 
methodological naturalism but wish to recognize the wider conversation surrounding this 
subject. 
2 And even if the word themselves were to blame, that would only indicate a 
sociological problem, not a conceptual one. See fn9, below. 
3 Tellingly, both are social scientists, as was Wolterstorff’s main example of B.F. 
Skinner in Reason Within the Bounds of Religion. In all of these examples, Vries initial reply 
seems apt: “Christians can well value behaviorist psychological theory”—and we might add 
Stark and Simon here—“while denouncing the misguided attempts to pervert such a 
psychological theory into an entire philosophical anthropology.” 
4 Notwithstanding de Vries’s claim on his personal website that “He is properly 
credited for inventing (1982) the term ‘methodological naturalism,’ a concept that clarifies a 
central issue in the philosophy of science,” Brightman’s lecture was delivered almost fifty 
years prior. Perhaps more tellingly, J.I. Packer introduced to term to evangelical audiences in 
1967 in connection to his critique of ‘scientific’ interpretation of the Bible. Both the 
transcript of Brightman’s lecture and Packer’s book were in Wheaton College Library when 
de Vries was an Associate Dean there (1979-1989). Thanks to Kevin Nordby for research 
assistance. 
5 Torrance 2017, 692-693. Torrance seemingly gets this from Michael Rea (705). 
However, Rea’s objections don’t really fit here. Above we noted that MN is used in least two 
different senses, as distinguished by the SEP entry: ‘the relation between religion and 
science’ sense (which involves de Vries and Plantinga) and ‘the relation between philosophy 
and science’ sense, with which SEP is concerned. The book by Rea that Torrance cites is 
about the latter (Rea 2002). The first sense is roughly concerned with the question, “Should 
theists practice the scientific method differently than anyone else?” The second is about 
philosophical practice, “Is there more to philosophy than gathering empirical data, and if so, 
what?” 
Rea might well be right that MN and metaphysical naturalism collapse in on 
themselves in the second sense (establishing that would be a separate question), but they do 
not in the first. Obviously the two are related, and insights from one might be able to help 
with the other. Nonetheless, they are different debates and more to the point, Rea’s reasons 
for thinking that both varieties of naturalism (metaphysical and methodological) collapse in 
on themselves are specifically concerned with the relation between philosophy and science, 
and only apply there. His reasons are irrelevant to the question of scientific method among 
theists, which Torrance asks. 
6 Here, Torrance defines MN, somewhat tautologically, by reference to both 
naturalistically and secularly. But this is what we are trying to figure out: is MN a synonym 
for secular? ‘Naturalistic’ in this context is ambiguous and loaded. 
7 Any worthwhile thought experiment will help both parties to state their cases in 
terms of the analogy, thus enabling each to pinpoint where the disagreement really lies. 
Whether our analogy works would depend on us showing that there is something to be gained 
by scientists—and volleyball referees—limiting themselves to what they can see 
(empiricism). Torrance, too, could make his claim via the analogy. It would depend on 
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establishing science’s current rules needing improvement. On its face, that is perfectly 
reasonable; any practice can change its rules, be it volleyball or volcanology. We think there 
is something to be gained by preserving MN as one of science’s rules, but we would agree 
with Torrance that this is a debate worth having. Among our reasons for wanting to preserve 
MN is (1) how it allows us to identify anomalies (pressing us to humbly keep digging), and 
(2) for some of the reasons set out in, ironically enough, Plantinga: the Christian view “of the 
contingency of nature has been one important source of the emphasis upon 
the empirical character of modern science” (1997). All that is a worthwhile topic for another 
day. 
8 While space prevents a full discussion here, Torrance seems to assume an 
incompatibilist approach to special divine action: if there is a scientific explanation available 
for any event, then it should not be considered divine action. Either physical causes are 
effective, or divine causes are operative—but not both. The incompatibilist assumption is far 
from representative of perspectives on divine action more broadly. This being the case, it is 
perhaps striking that the compatibilist alternative seems not to have been explored, as it is 
certainly a live option. If one works with some version of compatibilism, much of Torrance’s 
problem with MN disappears altogether. We have here opted to address his argument on 
other fronts, but this assumption looms large and will be immediately apparent to those 
familiar with the relevant literature.  
9 Suppose that Plantinga or Torrance reply by listing some real-life scientists who do 
not live up to this ideal. Perhaps Simon or Stark, to say nothing of Richard Dawkins and Jerry 
Coyne, refuse to keep digging and instead remain content with whatever best fits their 
preconceived theories, and hence refuse to acknowledge an anomaly. And suppose that the 
‘bad’ scientists outnumber the ‘good’ ones, the ones who keep digging. What then? 
Doubtless, this would be a sociological problem among the scientific community, but not a 
problem of proper method. The right answer would be: get more good scientists, not change 
the scientific method’s commitment to empiricism. Speaking for ourselves, we mostly 
encounter scientists who sound less like Professor Dawkins and more like Professor Uman. 
10 Lindberg 2007, 240-41. Even historians who otherwise disagree vehemently, such 
as Edward Grant and Andrew Cunningham, agree regarding this point. See Grant 2001, 
191ff; Cunningham and Williams 1993. 
11 Thanks to Sarah White of the School of History and Mark Thakkar, Philosophy, 
both of the University of St Andrews, for translating the entire surrounding passage in 
context, which was invaluable (Scriptum super Sententiis, liber I, distinctio II, quaestio 1). 
Edward Grant produces his own loose translation in Grant 2007, 258. 
12 What about that other locus classicus for defining miracle, book X of Hume’s 
Enquiry? We interpret Hume as saying what Michael Murray lists, in his textbook, as the 
fourth Humean-style argument for the impossibility of miracles (premises 7.21-7.26; Murray 
and Rea 2008, 206). To this argument, we share Murray’s retort: Hume gives no a priori 
reason to prefer his definition of ‘miracle’ to any other, and some reason to doubt it since it 
would make the impossibility of miracles true by definition. As Murray puts it, that seems 
rather a suspiciously convenient definition in the midst of arguing that miracles are 
impossible. In fact, Hume himself inadvertently lets so much slip in his footnote to Locke on 
probability (note 10). (Unlike us, Murray doesn’t make the additional claim that this was 
actually Hume’s view, calling it only ‘Humean-style.’)  
But, what Murray lists as the third Humean-style argument, ‘the purely anomalous 
event’ argument (premises 7.14-7.20), is stronger than Murray thinks. Hume defines miracle 
as “a transgression of a law of nature by [1] particular volition of the Deity, or by [2] the 
interposition of some invisible agent” (note K). Murray reads this as two different ways to 
say ‘God’, and he may be right as far as the historical Hume is concerned. But if not every 
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‘invisible agent’ is divine (as most natural philosophers took for granted; e.g. lunar forces), 
the argument starts to sound stronger, since it would enable Hume to modify premise 7.16 by 
positing something between ‘divinely caused’ and ‘not caused at all’. See below, on 
Thomas’s letter to the knight. 
13 Aquinas SCG, 3:101. Some of the difficulty in interpreting Thomas on this is 
terminological: Latin has no direct equivalent for the English word miracle (neither has 
Greek, in fact). Instead, in biblical Greek there were four words; to writers of Latin, they 
were wonders. Thomas makes much of this etymology and it proves to be a source of endless 
puns (all wonders are wonderful, and the like). 
14 Aquinas ST, 1.105.7. How would new scientific discoveries impact what is 
categorized as a miracle? Sometimes, Thomas seems to lean in one direction, positing an 
absolute limit of human knowledge: “as having a cause absolutely hidden from all” and 
“absolutely wonderful is that which has a cause absolutely hidden.” And, sometimes he leans 
in the other direction, positing a relative limit: which we “are accustomed to observe,” 
“which God does outside those causes which we know,” and “beyond the order commonly 
observed in nature.” Thomas got the first of these latter quotes from Augustine, who seemed 
to believe that there were ‘miraculous’ properties hidden in nature, and maybe expected us to 
one day discover some of them. See Augustine, City of God, XXI.8. 
15 See Coyne 2015, Dennett & Plantinga 2010, Plantinga 2011. Plantinga knows 
enough theology that he knows better than to claim, simply, that science conflicts with 
religion. Does he mean (for example) that Rodney Stark’s views are incompatible with the 
views of the current Board of Elders of South Bend Christian Reformed Church? In short, he 
needs to say whose theology and which science.  
16 A few previous readers disagreed with this sentence more hotly than they did with 
all our comments on MN put together. Suffice it to say, we cannot fully defend it within these 
pages, but to preempt some of the more frequently asked questions: (1) Yes, we have read ST 
1:1.5 (the handmaiden passage). (2) No, we don’t think that what Thomas says there fully 
solves the question. (3) It is not that we necessarily disagree, it is just that ‘noble’ (his word) 
isn’t a term with an analytically clear meaning; same goes for ‘queen’, come to that, which 
was our word. (4) We do disagree with what he says in the Reply to Objection 2. It meets the 
objection only by using slight of hand, since it is not the case that music:arithmetic :: 
military:politics. All this would be a topic worth pursuing. 
